The challenge of achieving MDA is of a particular concern to the US Department of Defense and to the Canadian Department of National Defence. Consequently, there is a real need for the military operational research and analysis (OR&A) community to provide the necessary analytic support to ensure that MDA generation efforts mature in support of our national objectives.
Background:
US Actions
No nation, let alone a single agency, has the capability or capacity to achieve MDA unilaterally. MDA requires broad collaboration among many partners, each with a potentially vital contribution to effective understanding of the maritime domain. Since 2002 government agencies within the United States and Canada have promulgated strategies for homeland security from a maritime perspective.
In December 2002, the US Coast Guard published its “Maritime Strategy for Homeland Security,” which established key objectives and means to achieve them to mitigate the risks associated with threats to our Nation’s maritime security and to prevent terrorist attacks. The primary components of this strategy include awareness of threats and vulnerabilities, prevention and protection against these threats, and response to potential attacks.
National Security Presidential Directive 41 / Homeland Security Presidential Directive 13 (NSPD-41/HSPD-13) (Maritime Security Policy, 21 December 2004) established policy guidelines to enhance national and homeland security by protecting U.S. maritime interests. This presidential directive underscores the importance of securing the maritime domain, which is defined as: “All areas and things of, on, under, relating to, adjacent to, or bordering on a sea, ocean, or other navigable waterway, including all maritime-related activities, infrastructure, people, cargo, and vessels and other conveyances.”
On 2 April 2004, Admiral Thomas H. Collins, 22nd Commandant of the US Coast Guard, established the Maritime Domain Awareness Steering Committee and the Maritime Domain Awareness Directorate. In a message to the entire Coast Guard Admiral Collins stated, “No capability is more central to our continued success as a military service, law enforcement agency, and member of the intelligence community than achieving effective maritime domain awareness (MDA). The current working definition for MDA is ‘the effective understanding of anything in the marine environment that could adversely affect America’s security, safety, economy, or environment.’ Domain awareness is a 21st Century manifestation of the very essence of our motto, Semper Paratus. No other entity is as uniquely positioned as the United States Coast Guard to ensure MDA success provided we are internally aligned, optimally configured, and our efforts synchronized.”
On 29 May 2007, then Chief of Naval Operations, ADM Mike Mullen, approved for dissemination the Navy Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) Concept. The Concept presented “a vision for the exchange and use of maritime information in support of maritime security and safety.” According to the National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness (October 2005): “Maritime Domain Awareness is the effective understanding of anything associated with the maritime domain that could impact the security, safety, economy, or environment of the United States.”
General Gene Renuart, commander of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) and U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM), addressed an audience of approximately 700 military and civilian space industry representatives 11 April 2007 at the 23rd National Space Symposium. The general commented on the change in the command’s mission in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. He stated that the recently renewed NORAD agreement between the U.S. and Canada, and the addition of Maritime Domain Awareness to NORAD’s mission is a “long haul” relationship that will rely heavily on space-based assets. He also pointed out that the Maritime Domain Awareness mission of NORAD not only crosses lines with NORTHCOM’s mission of homeland defense, but requires improved capabilities in tracking and detection. “NORAD has the detection and warning mission. NORTHCOM is charged with the defense of the homeland in the maritime environment. Those worlds come together every day in our headquarters. My vision is one that takes the sea, the land … and the air domain, networks them together, and feeds that into a network supported by space capabilities that allows situational awareness over a much broader area. It’s that kind of ingenuity, collaboration and networking that we need to create to allow us at NORTHCOM and NORAD to defend the homeland in the best possible fashion.”
Canadian Actions
Canada, with the worlds the longest coastline bordering on three oceans, is investing heavily in improving its ability to deliver relevant domestic maritime surveillance to identify and act on activities which impact upon our national interests. After 9/11, and in light of other challenges to Canadian sovereignty that have occurred in recent years, the types of threats that Canada is focused on are multi-dimensional and include economic, environmental and criminal activity, as well as terrorist attacks and military activity. In addition, Canada has equally important roles in the defence of North American and in contributing to global security which now includes counter-piracy operations as a priority. These roles have been reaffirmed as recently as May 2008 with the publication of the Canada First Defence Strategy. To help fulfill these roles, Canada is upgrading its capabilities to develop and maintain MDA both for North American security as well as for Canadian assets engaged in deployed operations. Investments in MDA include improvements in gathering, analysis, integration, use, dissemination and sharing of decision quality information gained from a combination of maritime, land, air and space surveillance systems as well as the integration of intelligence and information available from major stakeholders in maritime security such as other government departments, allies and the commercial sector as well as a host of other non-governmental agencies and stakeholders.
A key Canadian investment has been the establishment of Maritime Security Operational Centers (MSOCs) on the east and west coasts of Canada as well as the establishment of the Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway (GL/SLS) MSOC. The government has increased airborne maritime surveillance and is maintaining its investing in earth observation of the marine environment through RADARSAT 2 program and is augmenting its capacity with the follow-on RADARSAT Constellation program. Substantial new investments in Research, Development and Analysis programs are being made to address the MDA Challenges in the areas of sensor development, data fusion, information management, visualization, threat assessment and information dissemination and Command and Control. As an enabler for the effective MDA, the necessity of reviewing, vetting and updating existing governmental Memorandums of Understanding (MOUs) Memorandums of Agreement as well as understanding the legal barriers to information sharing amongst stakeholders has been identified.
Counter-Piracy
In recent years a number of maritime chokepoints have seen rising incidences of piracy (in itself a term not precisely defined or understood in all instances and venues). These incidents of piracy (and other associated illegal activities) have reflected, in part, accentuated disparities of incomes, invasions of territorial and exclusive economic zones, disruptions of viable governmental processes and controls, displacements of economic activities, varying levels of political and organizational corruption, increased levels of criminal activities and collusions, and changes in regional environmental resources and conditions. The palette of contributing factors varies from location to location at any instant, and varies over time in any particular venue. Simultaneously, the volume of maritime vessels passing through the chokepoints has been increasing, thus providing increased levels of opportunities to those engaged in piratical activities.
Recent dissuasive and countering activities have included national, NATO, and Combined Task Force patrols, escorts, and responses, but, nonetheless, such efforts are challenged by the enormity of the surface areas of potential acts, the adaptive tactics of pirates, and the tensions between costs (direct and indirect), impacts (direct and indirect), and benefits. This workshop will primarily address situations in the most active regions—the Gulf of Aden, the Horn of Africa, and the eastern cost of Somalia.
Meeting Objectives:
This special meeting explored and identified ways in which operational research and analysis (OR&A) supports the activities related to the generation of MDA. Critical to the success of this workshop was be the participation of the operational and policy communities. The meeting brought together analysts specializing in a variety of OR applications capable of providing insight and direction to the MDA process.
Desired Outcomes:
There are four desired outputs from this workshop: